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1 Introduction 1 
During the 20th century, Switzerland has been profoundly transformed by a still ongoing process 
of metropolitanization. This process has revealed a metamorphosis of relevant elements of urban 
centrality (see Leresche et al. 1995; Cunha and Schuler 2001; Bassand 2005). Externally, 
metropolitanization involves the connection to a global order of inter-urban networks. Internally, 
it has led to a recomposition of the urban space, in the sense that metropolitan areas2 are 
nowadays the dominant form of human settlement in Switzerland. These metropolitan areas are 
increasingly functionally integrated, mainly thanks to the development of high capacity transport 
infrastructure. Spatial mobility of goods and persons allows an increasing functional 
specialization of soil, leading not only to accelerated urban sprawl and further expansion of 
metropolitan areas, but in the same time to social segregation within them. As others (Huissoud 
et al. 1999; Cunha et al. 1998) and ourselves (Kübler and Scheuss 2005) have shown, Swiss 
metropolitan areas are increasingly segregated. As elsewhere, social inequalities translate into 
spatial inequalities in Switzerland.  
Against this background, the goal of this paper is to explore the link between spatial inequalities 
and governance in Swiss metropolitan areas. Drawing on the research agenda outlined by the 
International Metropolitan Observatory (IMO), our overall aim is to show to what extent public 
policies set up in metropolitan places can be seen to be conditioned by spatial inequalities – thus 
reinforcing them – or, to the contrary, must be viewed as a response to problems – thus 
alleviating these inequalities. To put it in other words, the objective is to establish whether policy 
choices of metropolitan communes merely reflect the socio-economic differences found among 
them, or whether they express some kind of voluntarism aimed at acting upon these differences. 
As we will argue throughout the paper, policies are not directly determined by social inequalities, 
but this relationship is mediated by politics which is, in turn, strongly shaped by patterns of 
spatial segregation. 
More precisely, our argument will be developed in four steps. The following section describes the 
                                                 
1
 This paper is based on research conducted for the project Assessing the trend towards new regionalism in Swiss metropolitan 
areas, financed by the National Centre of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century at the 
University of Zurich.  
2
 The notion of metropolitan area originates in the US Census Bureau’s terminology used to define areas of functionally integrated 
urban settlements spread over different administrative boundaries. The official nomenclature of territorial statistics used by 
the Swiss Statistical Office uses the term of agglomerations (in German: Agglomerationen; in French: agglomerations; in 
Italian: agglomerati). They are conceptually equivalent to the US Metropolitan Areas (Schuler 1999: 334-340). Throughout 
this text, we will use the term 'metropolitan areas' as a synonym of agglomerations.  
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methods and data used: structural (i.e. socio-demographic as well as morphological), political and 
financial data collected at the communal level in the seven largest Swiss metropolitan areas. It 
also establishes a typology of communes in metropolitan areas, used in the subsequent bi-variate 
analyses. The next section provides an overview of the political ecology of Swiss metropolitan 
areas, i.e. the spatial patterns of political behaviour therein. (This section mainly draws on 
analyses done in a previous phase of the IMO-project.) Section 4 then presents bivariate analyses 
of communal financial data on revenues and transfers payments, as well as on expenditures in 
four policy fields: (1) basic governmental functions and safety, (2) redistributive policies, (3) 
developmental policies, and (4) amenities policies. In section 5, we use multi-level regression 
techniques in order to single out communal as well as metropolitan-level determinants of 
communal expenditures in these four policy fields. The aim here notably is to identify the 
separate and combined influence of socio-structural and political variables on communal policy 
profiles. The conclusion wraps up the main findings and discusses them in the light of the 
overarching question of the workshop. 
 
2 Data and method 
Our analysis is based on communal data on socio-economic composition, spatial context, voting 
behavior and public finances covering the years 1990 and 2000, in the seven largest metropolitan 
areas in Switzerland – i.e. over or near 200’000 inhabitants according to the 2000 population 
census.3 
2.1 Metropolitan areas under scrutiny 
The sample consists of 482 communes in seven large metropolitan areas of Switzerland.4 These 
are the metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle, Geneva, Berne, Lausanne, Lucerne and Lugano. 
Metropolitan areas are defined according to the official statistical nomenclature formulated by the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (Schuler et al. 2005)(Table 1). 
                                                 
3
 The metropolitan area of Lugano is included in order to account for the entire variation across the three language regions (Kriesi 
1996). 
4
 Data on the foreign communes, i.e. those communes pertaining to one of the cross-border metropolitan areas (Basle, Geneva, 
Lugano) but located in Germany, France or Italy, were not available. Hence, only communes located within Switzerland were 
included in the subsequent analysis.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny (data for 2000) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Overall population Overall number of 
communes 
Population outside 
core city (%) 
Density (inh. per 
hectare) 
Index of 
geopolitical 
fragmentation 
Zurich 1,080,728 132 66.3 9.95 3.6 
Basle 731,167 127 77.2 9.95* 4.4* 
Geneva 645,608 131 72.4 10.32* 4.2* 
Bern 349,096 43 63.2 7.25 3.3 
Lausanne 311,441 70 59.9 9.97 5.6 
Lucerne 196,550 17 69.7 9.94 2.9 
Lugano 136,032 77 80.5 5.85* 27.1* 
* excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas 
 
2.2. Typology of suburban communes 
In order to capture socio-economic differentiations within the suburban belt, we established a 
fivefold typology. Using socio-economic and contextual data the following procedure has been 
adopted as suggested by the IMO protocol: 
1. Separate out the central city (urban concentration) in each metropolitan area. 
2. Use a factor based on density, new housing, and distance to the centre to separate out low density suburbs. Use 
the third 25th percentile as separator. 
3. Use a factor based on low education, retirees, unemployment, foreigners, low socio-economic status, non-
western European languages, university education, highest status occupational group, and homeownership to 
separate out poor suburbs, middle class suburbs, and affluent suburbs. Use the 33rd percentiles as separators. 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the typology regarding some distinctive socio-economic and 
morphological characteristics. These allow discerning the main spatial patterns of socio-
economic differentiation within Swiss metropolitan areas. In sum, they suggest the existence of 
significant social disparities within Swiss metropolitan areas. However, these disparities do not 
follow a pattern of polarisation between the core city and its suburbs, but between the core city 
and the poor suburbs on the one hand, and the middle class, affluent, and low density communes 
on the other hand. 
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Table 2: Typology of communes in Swiss metropolitan areas 
(except for population, table entries are corrected for metropolitan area effects; see below) 
Type of commune (N) 
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Year 1990 
Overall (482) 2,869,895 36.3 20.5 85.3 22.1 12.6 11.8 44.2 
Urban concentration (7) 1,065,331 57.0 32.4 87.6 13.6 21.7 - 18.8 
Poor suburbs (119) 850,869 47.1 26.0 85.8 20.7 12.7 10.3 39.1 
Middle class suburbs (118) 493,198 36.2 19.5 85.1 21.4 13.2 10.8 41.2 
Affluent suburbs (118) 247,234 28.0 17.5 84.8 22.6 12.4 9.1 45.3 
Low density suburbs (118) 213,263 32.4 18.1 85.3 24.1 11.3 17.7 52.6 
Year 2000 
Overall (482) 3,009,237 35.1 21.8 83.0 21.7 7.3 11.8 32.7 
Urban concentration (7) 1,047,399 56.7 36.2 89.0 14.7 12.3 - 10.6 
Poor suburbs (119) 952,162 49.5 29.0 84.5 20.4 8.5 10.3 27.5 
Middle class suburbs (119) 502,624 33.9 20.9 82.7 21.2 7.6 10.6 28.5 
Affluent suburbs (119) 274,148 25.1 18.5 82.5 22.0 6.8 9.5 33.8 
Low density suburbs (118) 232,904 30.6 17.8 82.1 23.8 6.1 17.6 42.5 
1
 summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/5, where: 
x1: proportion of people with low socio-economic status 
x2: proportion of unemployed people 
x3: proportion of people with low education profile 
x4 proportion of people in residences where number of rooms is smaller than number of occupants 
x5: proportion of retired people 
2
 percentage of maximum value of the Simpson index (Simpson index=1-Σpi2, where p stands for the proportion of occupied people in three socio-professional 
categories; maximum value: Simpson index when all p= 1/number of categories) 
3
 proportion of dwelling houses built during the last 20 years (without renovations) 
 
Except for the proportions of new housing and retired people the figures are rather constant over 
time. On average the proportion of new housing has decreased by 11.5 percent points whereas the 
proportion of retired people has decreased by 5.3 percent points. Yet, the general pattern has 
almost not changed from 1990 to 2000. 
Urban concentrations (equal to core cities in the cases under scrutiny here) show the highest 
portions of socio-economic hardship. They are even more distressed than the poor suburbs which 
come second. No clear distinction can be made between middle class suburbs and low density 
suburbs. The lowest levels of socio-economic hardship are found in affluent communes. 
This general pattern holds true if we consider the proportion of foreign born residents, which we 
can take as a measure for the presence of immigrants. The largest proportions of residents born 
abroad are found in the core cities, followed by poor and middle class suburbs. Affluent and low 
density suburbs have the lowest proportion of foreign born residents. 
Economic diversity is higher in core cities than in the rest of the metropolitan areas – thereby 
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reflecting the functional differentiation and the economic centrality of core cities within 
metropolitan areas. Poor suburbs are somewhat more diverse economically speaking but not as 
much as central cities. There are almost no differences between middle class, affluent and low 
density suburbs which all show the least economic diversity and thereby appear as rather 
homogenous entities. 
The indicator for the presence of families, the proportion of inhabitants aged under 18 years, 
shows that the number of families increases as one moves from the central cities out to the 
metropolitan fringe. Indeed, the proportion of families is lowest in core cities and highest in low 
density suburbs, with poor, middle class and affluent suburbs in-between. This undoubtedly 
reflects the higher availability of family housing in the metropolitan fringe.  
If families with young children tend to concentrate in the outskirts of metropolitan areas, the 
reverse is also true. Indeed, the proportion of retired people steeply decreases as one moves from 
the core cities to poor, middle class, affluent and low density suburbs. 
Last but not least, the fivefold typology of communes within metropolitan areas also relates to 
geographical and morphological dimensions. On the one hand, and partly due to the procedure 
followed to construct the communal typology, low density suburbs are those locations with the 
greatest distance from the centre, middle class suburbs come second. Poor, middle class and 
affluent suburbs are closer to the centre. This also means that metropolitan areas differ according 
to the spatial organisation (distances) of the communal types. 
New housing is important in low density suburbs, which is also in line with the procedure 
followed to construct the communal typology. It is lowest in central cities. Poor and middle class 
suburbs display similar proportions of new housing whereas affluent suburbs show higher 
proportions. 
2.3 Data sources and data collection 
The lion’s share of data has been provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and the Swiss 
Federal Tax Administration.5 Yet, data on local political variables as well as local public finance 
data are rarely centrally stored and had to be collected for the purpose of this paper. A request to 
provide local electoral as well as additional data on public finance was sent to all the 482 
communes under scrutiny in this project. Data was delivered mostly on paper and had to be 
                                                 
5
 For an overview see the appendix 
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entered manually in the database.6 
Data collection has not yet finished and the dataset is still fragmentary. In Table 3 we have listed 
overall ranges of return rates as regards public finance data. The return rates differ strongly 
according to the variables and the years to which they refer. In general return rates are better with 
revenue data and data from 2000. They are generally worse with expenditure data and data from 
1990. More specific figures on valid cases are reported in the subsequent tables. 
Table 3: Overall ranges of return rates of public finance data 
 Communes (N) Valid (N) Return rate 
Metropolitan area 482 89 – 247 18 - 51 % 
Zurich 132 25 – 27 19 - 20 % 
Basle 74 62 – 71 84 - 96 % 
Geneva 74 0 – 74 0 - 100 % 
Berne 43 1 – 5 2 - 12 % 
Lausanne 70 0 – 70 0 - 100 % 
Lucerne 17 0 0 
Lugano 72 0 0 
Type of commune 482 89 – 247 18 – 51 % 
Urban concentrations 7 0 – 2 0 - 29 % 
Poor suburbs 119 18 – 51 15 - 43 % 
Middle class suburbs 119 12 – 49 10 - 41 % 
Affluent suburbs 119 19 – 68 16 - 57 % 
Low density suburbs 118 39 – 78 33 - 66 % 
* Range of return rates apply to both years of reference (1990 and 2000) and the ten variables used in the below analysis. 
For more specific figures on valid cases see below. Not taken into account are the return rates of the tax rate index as these 
data are available - though only for the year 2001 - for all communes under scrutiny. 
 
The overview of the return rates gives an idea of possible biases. Whereas the metropolitan areas 
of Basle, Geneva and Lausanne generally display return rates of more than 80 percent there are 
no cases representing the metropolitan areas of Lucerne and Lugano. Especially in the case of the 
only Italian speaking metropolitan area of Lugano this is deplorable. The metropolitan areas of 
Zurich and Basle are represented by less than 20 percent valid cases. Note that range of return 
rates of metropolitan areas of Geneva and Lausanne goes from 0 to 100 percent. This is due to 
poor availability of appropriate expenditure data. 
As regards the communal typology the number of cases of urban concentrations amounts to 
seven. The number of urban concentrations that are actually in the sample varies between 0 and 
2. These two cases correspond to the core cities of the two French speaking metropolitan areas of 
Geneva and Lausanne. Furthermore, return rates indicate that our results may be biased to low 
                                                 
6
 Data collection takes place in the context of a Research Seminar held by the authors at the University of Zurich. The authors are 
grateful to all the participants in the Research Seminar, and particularly to Philippe Rochat, for precious help in this herculean 
endeavour. 
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density and affluent suburbs as poor and middle class suburbs are underrepresented. However we 
did not weight data in our analyses as missing cases can not be supposed to be distributed 
randomly. 
Data was adjusted for systematic variation among metropolitan areas (metropolitan area effect) 
by subtracting the difference of overall mean and metropolitan area mean from raw data. As 
multi-level analyses from earlier research indicate (see also below) there is indeed substantial 
variance among Swiss metropolitan areas. Adjusted data has been computed using the following 
formula: 
 
( )RRRA jijij −−=           (1) 
where 
A: adjusted data 
R: raw data 
i: commune subscript 
j: metropolitan area subscript 
 
3 The political ecology of Swiss metropolitan areas 
The party system in Switzerland today is structured according to two major political conflicts 
(Kriesi et al. 2006). First, there still is the classical left-right conflict, based on the socio-
economic divide between workers and owners. Second there is a new conflict between those who 
are in favour of Switzerland as an internationally open and culturally liberal country and those 
who are in favour of isolationalism and national identity. Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that the socio-
structural basis of this second conflict relates to a differentiation in terms of winners and losers of 
globalisation: “The likely winners include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open 
to international competition as well as all kinds of cosmopolitan citizens. The expected losers, by 
contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all 
unqualified employees and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national 
community” (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922). 
3.1 Mapping political behaviour through partisanship 
Internationally comparative research on partisanship and voter preferences faces the challenge 
that common categories of comparison are difficult to establish, as the political positions 
mobilised by parties vary across different national contexts. For instance, a vote for a “liberal” 
party in the US context expresses a different voter preference than a vote for a “liberal” party in 
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Germany. In addition there are also evolving party programs as for instance the trend towards 
“new labour” in European social democracy.  
This methodological problem is particularly acute in the case of Switzerland, characterised by 
one of the most fragmented party system in the West European context, i.e. the presence of a 
large number of parties with similar shares of votes (Ladner 2007: 31). Before we can map voter 
preferences in the metropolitan areas under scrutiny here, we therefore need operational concepts 
that allow a sensible classification of voter preferences on the basis of party votes.  
Drawing on a content analysis of party programs, the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 
2001) has compiled data on the position of political parties on a variety of items across 25 
countries. On the basis of the available data for Switzerland, a score was calculated for each party 
in order to measure how this party is situated at the national elections considered in this analysis 
with respect to the two above identified major political conflicts, i.e. the left/right as well as the 
globalisation winner/loser conflict. 
3.2 Political divisions in Swiss metropolitan areas 
Using the communal level results for the national elections 1987, 1991, 1999 and 2003,7 the 
position of median voter on the two conflict scales was calculated for each of the 482 
metropolitan communes under scrutiny (see appendix for procedure). 
Table 4: Political divisions in Swiss metropolitan areas 2000  
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Type of commune (N) 
Manifesto 
Research Group 
left / right 
Globalisation 
winner / loser 
Year 1990 
Overall (482) -1.53 -.10 
Urban concentration (7) -6.94 1.42 
Poor suburbs (119) -4.46 .68 
Middle class suburbs (119) -2.03 .00 
Affluent suburbs (119) .27 -.63 
Low density suburbs (118) .46 -.53 
Year 2000 
Overall (482) 20.33 2.76 
Urban concentration (7) 3.46 3.69 
Poor suburbs (119) 18.25 3.40 
Middle class suburbs (119) 19.66 2.60 
Affluent suburbs (119) 22.21 2.15 
Low density suburbs (118) 22.21 2.83 
Note: Cleavage scores are averaged over two consecutive elections before and after 1990 and 2000 
respectively in order to smoothen short term fluctuations. 
                                                 
7
 The analysis of party voting in local elections is not realistically feasible in the Swiss context. On the one hand, access to such 
data is wrought with difficulties. On the other hand, even if such data was available, interpretation would be difficult, as local 
politics in Switzerland is characterised by strong presence of local parties and voters’ groups whose political positions are 
difficult to be compared across communes. Finally the Manifesto data apply to national party programs which may not 
correspond to programs of party sections in federal subunits. 
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The results suggest substantial political divisions among the types of metropolitan communes and 
these divisions have become more important during the 1990s (see Table 4). 
Regarding the left/right conflict in 1990 the core cities are with the left, affluent and low density 
suburbs with the right and poor and middle class suburbs with the centre. In 2000 one finds an 
important left/right divide between core cities and their suburbs. However, across the different 
types of suburbs the pattern has not changed. The electorate in poor and middle class suburbs 
more often votes for left parties than the electorate in low density and affluent suburbs. 
Regarding the more recent globalisation winner/loser conflict, in 1990 as well as in 2000 parties 
with programs in favour of globalisation winners seem most appealing to the electorate in middle 
class, affluent and low density suburbs whereas the electorate of core cities and poor suburbs 
more clearly support political positions in favour of globalisation losers. 
If we consider both conflicts simultaneously, an interesting threefold pattern emerges. On the one 
hand, preferences in affluent, low density and middle class suburbs are to the right and towards 
globalisation winner programs. This reflects ideological preferences that could be termed as 
right-wing liberalism. In core cities, preferences are economically as well as culturally to the left 
and in favour of globalisation loser programs – probably denoting more classic unionist leftism 
and protectionism related to value-based left wing politics. This is distinct from poor suburbs, 
where a combination of preferences for the right and for globalisation losers most probably 
relates to national-conservatism and authoritarianism. These results therefore confirm our earlier 
guesses about the existence of a threefold spatial differentiation of ideologies within Swiss 
metropolitan areas that came out of the analysis of mere party votes (Kübler and Scheuss 2005: 
225).  
3.3. Turnout in national and local elections in Swiss metropolitan areas 
The influence of metropolitanization on turnout has not been systematically assessed by electoral 
research in Switzerland to date. This is partly due to the fact that data on turnout of local elections 
is, as previously stated, not centrally available in Switzerland. 
Our data confirm previously published evidence in the sense that, in the communes of Swiss 
metropolitan areas, turnout is higher in local elections (mean of 52.5%) than in national elections 
(mean of 44.4%). This gap between relatively high local and low national electoral turnout thus 
seems to be a general feature of Swiss politics.  
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Figure 1: Election turnout in communes of Swiss metropolitan areas 2000 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
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Note: Election turnouts are averaged over two consecutive elections before and after 2000 (e.g. National Elections: 1999 and 2003) to smoothen short term variances. 
 
A closer look at the levels of local and national electoral turnout reveals that the gap between 
local and national turnout differs along the types of metropolitan communes (Figure 1). Overall, 
turnout is relatively low in core cities and poor suburbs, and higher in middle class, low density 
and affluent suburbs. The picture is more complex if we consider the gap between local and 
national turnout. On the one hand, it is interesting to note that this gap is almost non-existent in 
core cities. On the other hand, the difference between (higher) local and (lower) national turnout 
is quite large but similar for poor, middle class and affluent suburbs. It is even larger in low 
density suburbs. Thus, metropolitanization seems to go hand in hand with a delocalisation of the 
electorate. Whereas the electorate in core cities seems to be less locally oriented than in the 
suburban zones of a metropolitan area, local orientation is particularly strong in low density 
suburbs at the outskirts of a metropolitan area.  
 
4 Patterns of local revenues and capacities to provide public goods 
4.1 Total revenue and expenditure per capita 1990 and 2000 
As regards the extent of revenues and expenditures per capita there is an important discrepancy 
between the urban centre and surrounding areas (Table 5, Figure 2). This difference amounts to 
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about 4,400 CHF which means that the core city gains and spends more than twice as much as 
suburban communes. Among suburban communes the revenues and expenditures per capita do 
not differ very much though in affluent suburbs public income and spending are on average 
somewhat higher than in other suburbs. Note that the variance with low density suburbs is more 
important than with other communal types. Revenues generally exceed expenditures though 
middle class, affluent and low density suburbs generate higher benefits whereas the core city 
suffers a small deficit. 
Table 5: Average total revenue and expenditure per capita 1990, in CHF, prices of 2000 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of commune Revenue/capita N S.D. Expenditure/capita N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 8,263 1* . 8,285 1* . 
Poor suburbs 3,877 33 793.7 3,653 37 774.9 
Middle class suburbs 3,908 32 975.3 3,660 34 908.7 
Affluent suburbs 4166 44 851.9 3,941 44 854.7 
Low density suburbs 3,987 73 1102.4 3,652 77 1101.8 
Overall 4,020 183 1017.6 3,743 193 1010.6 
* Lausanne 
 
Figure 2: Local revenues and expenditures 1990 (prices of 2000) 
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In 2000 the picture is similar (Table 6, Figure 3). Yet, the difference between core city and 
suburbs has decreased to about 3,400 CHF which is almost completely due to the decrease of per 
capita expenditures in core cities. Hence there is less financial disparity between cities and their 
suburbs in 2000 than in 1990 though there is more variation within each communal type.  
Table 6: Average total revenue and expenditure per capita 2000, in CHF 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of commune Revenue/capita N S.D. Expenditure/capita N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 7,429 2* 3,165.4 7,166 2 3,563.9 
Poor suburbs 3,828 50 1,130.5 3,502 51 1,031.6 
Middle class suburbs 3,949 49 1,103.6 3,606 49 1,147.5 
Affluent suburbs 3,954 68 937.6 3,653 67 949.4 
Low density suburbs 4,147 74 1,145.1 3,907 78 1,230.2 
Overall 4,015 243 1,136.5 3,721 247 1,166.9 
* Lausanne (rev./cap.: 10,113 CHF; exp./cap.: 10,449 CHF), Geneva (rev./cap.: 4,823 CHF; exp./cap.: 4,331 CHF) 
 
Figure 3: Local revenues and expenditures 2000) 
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As the figures for the core cities of Lausanne and Geneva vary considerably this result may be 
random. However one may also think of two more substantial causal processes. Firstly, the new 
pattern of inter-communal disparities may reflect compensation mechanisms that have been 
amended during the 1990s to take transfer payments into account. This interpretation is somehow 
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put into question by the fact that financial disparities between core city and suburbs have 
increased in the metropolitan area of Lausanne where such compensation mechanisms are 
important. Secondly, as functional integration proceeds, the problem situation in core cities and 
suburban areas becomes more and more similar, as do policy responses and expenditures. Indeed, 
in an earlier analysis of data on urban hardship we have found an attenuation of the city-suburb 
polarization for the same period (Kübler and Scheuss 2005).  
Of the suburban communes low density suburbs display the highest revenues and expenditures 
per capita (4,147 and 3,907 CHF respectively). These communes also display a visible budget 
growth from 1990 to 2000 (+200 CHF/per capita on average). 
With every communal type revenue exceeds expenditures. However the benefit is more important 
in poor, middle class and affluent suburbs. Between 1990 and 2000 the financial situation has 
improved in core cities and worsened, i.e. decrease of benefit, in low density suburbs. 
 
4.2. Shares of transfer payments 1990 and 2000 
In the suburban belt there are important differences between revenues and expenditures related to 
financial transfer payments among local jurisdictions (about 18 %-points) (Table 7, Figure 4). In 
the core city revenues from transfer payments nearly match the transfer expenditures. The result 
suggests important financial outflows from communes in metropolitan areas to other public 
bodies. 
Interestingly the share of income from transfer payments of the core city's budget (5.5%) is lower 
than in suburban places (11.0 % on average). Though middle class suburbs have a small share of 
transfer income (9.0 %) it is still more important than the proportion found in the core city. 
Nevertheless, variances of transfer income within each suburban communal type are 
considerable. 
On the output side one finds a clear disparity between the transfer expenditures of the core cities 
and their surrounding communes. The difference amounts to about 20 percent-points. Among the 
suburban communes the share of transfer payments continuously increases as one goes from poor 
suburbs (27.5 %) to low density suburbs (30.3%). The variances of transfer expenditures within 
the suburban communal types are considerable, too. 
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Table 7: Average shares of transfer revenues and expenditures 1990, in % of total revenues and expenditures 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of commune Transfer 
revenues 
N S.D. Transfer 
expenditures N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 5.5 1* . 7.7 1* . 
Poor suburbs 11.0 33 6.34 27.5 33 6.98 
Middle class suburbs 9.0 32 6.57 27.6 32 7.69 
Affluent suburbs 12.3 42 8.99 28.9 43 9.27 
Low density suburbs 11.7 72 7.38 30.3 73 9.67 
Overall 11.2 180 7.50 28.9 182 8.93 
* Lausanne 
 
Figure 4: Transfer payments 1990 
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From 1990 to 2000 the disparity between shares of transfer payments income and expenditures 
has increased (Table 8, Figure 5). Whereas the level of transfer revenues shares has decreased 
from 11.2 to 9.4 percent, the level of transfer expenditures has risen from 28.9 to 31.1 percent 
thus widening the gap to almost 21 percent-points. 
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Table 8: Average shares of transfer revenues and expenditures in %, 2000 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of commune Transfer 
revenues 
N S.D. Transfer 
expenditures N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 6.5 2* .47 10.6 2* 5.23 
Poor suburbs 9.9 50 7.67 27.2 50 9.55 
Middle class suburbs 8.0 48 6.38 28.3 49 11.42 
Affluent suburbs 8.9 66 6.01 27.9 67 13.45 
Low density suburbs 10.4 74 6.57 39.0 74 12.11 
Overall 9.4 240 6.63 31.1 242 12.98 
* Lausanne, Geneva 
 
Figure 5: Transfer payments 2000 
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Save low density suburbs the general pattern, however, has remained constant: Similar transfer 
payments share in core cities, polarization between core-city and suburban area and important 
variations within communal types. In low density suburbs the proportion of transfer income has 
virtually not changed and the proportion of transfer expenditures has climbed by almost 10 
percent-points, reflecting the significant changes that have been made to the mechanisms of 
financial equalization in many metropolitan areas in Switzerland (see Kübler 2005). 
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4.3. Shares of tax entries, revenues from user charges and transfer payments 
1990 and 2000 
In order to assess revenue patterns we calculated the shares of the three most important revenue 
categories, i.e. taxes, user charges and transfer payments, which account for more than three 
fourth of total revenues in 1990 and 2000. 
 
Table 9: Average shares of tax entries, revenues from user charges and transfer payments revenue in %, 1990 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of commune tax entries N S.D. revenues form 
user charges N S.D. 
Transfer 
revenues 
N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 33.5 1* . 30.6 1* . 5.5 1* . 
Poor suburbs 54.8 33 9.27 9.6 33 7.24 11.0 33 6.34 
Middle class suburbs 58.4 32 11.08 12.6 32 7.61 9.0 32 6.57 
Affluent suburbs 59.0 43 9.93 8.6 42 5.27 12.3 42 8.99 
Low density suburbs 57.0 73 11.18 9.1 72 6.02 11.7 72 7.38 
Overall 57.2 182 10.68 9.8 180 6.67 11.2 180 7.50 
* Lausanne 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of selected revenues 1990 
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The graph shows the total revenue shares of tax entries, revenues from user charges and revenues 
from transfer payments in 1990 (Figure 6). Indeed, taxes are the most important source of income 
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for communes in Swiss metropolitan areas. However, revenues from user charges are almost 
equally important in the core city (30.6 against 33.5 %) which suggests, again, different patterns 
of local revenue in core cities and suburbia. 
Across suburban communal types tax entries display only minor variance. As one may have 
expected tax entries are a bit less important in poor suburbs (54.8 %) and they are equally 
important in affluent, middle class and low density suburbs. Finally, there is relatively less 
variance across communal types regarding income from transfer payments though transfer 
revenue shares in suburban communes are somewhat higher. 
As already observed above, the variances within communal types are substantial. Therefore 
differences between two types may be insignificant in statistical terms when they are small. 
The 2000 picture (Table 10, Figure 7) is similar and even accentuates 1990 tendencies. In core 
cities revenues from user charges (34.7 %) exceed tax entries share (26.2 %) and are hence the 
most important income category. Among suburban communes poor suburbs display the lowest 
tax entries share (52.2 %) whereas it is highest in affluent suburbs (60.8 %). Finally, with the 
exception of tax entries, variances across communal types are again rather small. 
 
Table 10: Average shares of tax entries, revenues from user charges and transfer payments revenue in %, 
2000 (corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of communes tax entries N S.D. revenues form 
user charges N S.D. 
Transfer 
revenues 
N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 26.2 1* . 34.7 1* . 6.5 2* .47 
Poor suburbs 52.2 39 10.57 12.0 39 7.20 9.9 50 7.67 
Middle class suburbs 58.2 38 10.42 11.4 36 6.75 8.0 48 6.38 
Affluent suburbs 60.8 49 10.39 10.5 48 7.00 8.9 66 6.01 
Low density suburbs 57.0 73 10.75 9.9 73 4.58 10.4 74 6.57 
Overall 57.1 200 11.07 10.9 197 6.42 9.4 240 6.63 
* Lausanne 
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Figure 7: Distribution of selected revenues 2000 
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4.4 Tax rates 2001 
In order to assess the importance of taxation with the population in each commune a tax rate 
index had been computed. An index value of 100 indicates that a commune displays an average 
tax rate with respect to all communes in the same canton. Note that the borders of cantons and the 
delimitations of metropolitan areas are never congruent. However, combined with controlling for 
metropolitan area effects we suggest this as a pragmatic approach to measure tax burden of a 
commune. 
 
j
ij
ij t
t
I 100=            (2) 
where 
I: taxe rate index 
t: tax rate 
i: commune subscript 
j: canton subscript 
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Table 11: Average tax rate index 2001 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Type of commune Tax rate index N S.D. 
Urban concentrations 99.0 7 10.61 
Poor suburbs 95.9 119 11.90 
Middle class suburbs 92.2 119 14.23 
Affluent suburbs 90.1 119 16.17 
Low density suburbs 90.1 118 17.40 
Overall 92.2 482 15.15 
 
Figure 8: Tax rate index 2001 
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There is a clear pattern as to the evolution of tax rates within metropolitan areas: one finds the 
least taxation in affluent and middle class suburbs (index values of 90.1 each)(Figure 8). Keeping 
in mind the high proportion of tax revenues, these places show, indeed, important financial 
capacities. Conversely tax burden is heavy in core cities (99.0) where the share of tax entries is 
very small. Poor and middle class suburbs are placed in-between (95.9 and 92.2 respectively). 
However it is interesting to see that even urban concentrations are below cantonal averages of 
communal tax rates. This result points to the fact that metropolitan areas have important financial 
resources at their disposal. One has also to be aware that the tax burden on taxpayers still varies 
substantially within the same types of communes as reflected by important standard deviations. 
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Put together these results suggest three general findings. First, the most important disparities with 
respect to public finance capacities are to be found between core cities and their surrounding 
communes. Second, patterns of local revenue do not change significantly over time except for 
level shifts. Third, although various patterns of revenue correspond to theoretical expectations 
there are still important variances among communes of the same type which calls for more 
detailed analyses. 
4.5 Distribution of local expenditures 
Based on the IMO protocol and using official data on local government spending we built four 
categories of local expenditures. However, the official classification differs across cantons. In 
order to adopt as much as possible the theoretical concepts we had to exclude about half of the 
communes - among them all core cities - whose classifications did not allow appropriate 
aggregations. 
Hence we suggest the following fourfold classification: 
 
• The first category consists of spending on basic governmental functions, i.e. central administrative services and 
public safety.  
• The second category refers to redistributive policies which include the official expenditure items education and 
social welfare.  
• The third category affects spending on developmental policies. These involve transportation, environment and 
land use planning as well as economic development.  
• Finally, with our fourth category we assess spending on amenities policies which encompass culture and leisure 
as well as health. 
 
Table 12: Average shares of local government spending on various functions 1990 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Type of commune (N) Basic governmental functions Redistributive policies 
Developmental 
policies 
Amenities policies 
 % S.D. % S.D. % S.D. % S.D. 
Urban concentrations (0) . . . . . . . . 
Poor suburbs (18) 21.6 4.61 48.6 5.30 21.3 3.72 8.5 2.89 
Middle class suburbs (12) 20.9 3.79 47.5 5.13 22.4 3.63 9.1 3.51 
Affluent suburbs (20) 24.0 5.47 47.2 9.88 23.8 8.77 5.1 2.87 
Low density suburbs (39) 25.6 5.55 45.3 6.43 21.2 2.76 8.0 3.34 
Overall (89) 23.8 5.41 46.7 7.02 22.0 5.03 7.6 3.43 
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Figure 9: Distribution of local expenditures 1990 
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Overall the expenditure shares do not vary substantially across communal types in metropolitan 
areas (Table 12, Figure 9). Spending on redistributive policies is the most important category and 
makes almost 50 percent of total local expenditures. Spending on redistributive policies is 
somewhat more important in poor suburbs (48.6 %). Its share decreases to 45.3 percent when one 
goes to low density suburbs. 
Furthermore poor and middle class suburbs spend a bit less on basic government functions (21.6 
and 20.9 % respectively) than affluent and low density suburbs (24.0 and 25.6 % respectively). 
Comparing expenditures for developmental and amenities policies one finds inverse patterns: 
Whereas poor, middle class and low density suburbs spend less on developmental policies (21.3, 
22.4 and 21.2 % respectively) than affluent suburbs (23.8 %), they display higher proportions of 
expenditures for amenities policies (8.5, 9.1 and 8.0 % respectively) than affluent suburbs (5.1 %). 
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Table 13: Average shares of local government spending on various functions 2000 (corrected for 
metropolitan area effect) 
Type of commune (N) Basic governmental functions Redistributive policies 
Developmental 
policies 
Amenities policies 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Urban concentrations (0) . . . . . . . . 
Poor suburbs (24) 18.4 4.18 54.6 5.01 17.8 4.32 9.2 3.27 
Middle class suburbs (17) 19.2 4.21 48.0 8.75 23.8 11.39 9.0 5.42 
Affluent suburbs (19) 22.6 4.17 50.8 7.89 19.8 5.02 6.8 3.92 
Low density suburbs (42) 22.7 4.78 52.2 5.16 17.3 3.99 7.8 2.97 
Overall (102) 21.1 4.79 51.8 6.67 19.0 6.44 8.1 3.77 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of local expenditures 2000 
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In 2000 spending on redistributive policies is still the most important category and its share has 
even increased from 46.7 in 1990 to 51.8 percent (Table 13, Figure 10). Although redistributive 
expenditures are still highest with poor communes (54.6 %), affluent and low density suburbs 
(50.8 and 52.2 % respectively) have experienced important increases.  
Regarding developmental spending there had been a decrease of the shares in poor, affluent and 
low density suburbs (17.8, 19.8 and 17.3 % respectively) whereas the share have remained almost 
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constant in middle class suburbs (23.8 %). Comparing these results with the figures on 
redistributive spending there is a clear inverse pattern across communal types. This suggests that 
there is a trade off between redistributive and developmental spending. 
The same is true for basic government and amenities expenditures: Whereas poor and middle 
class suburbs spend less on basic governmental functions (18.4 and 19.2 % respectively) than 
affluent and low density suburbs (22.6 and 22.7 % respectively) spending on amenities is more 
important in poor and middle class suburbs (9.2 and 9.0 % respectively) than in affluent and low 
density suburbs (6.8 and 7.8 % respectively). 
In general expenditures for redistributive policies cover the most important share of local 
government spending in all types of suburban communes. Its proportion amounts to about half of 
an average local government's total expenditures. Although variance across communal types is 
small poor suburbs often display the highest expenditure shares for this category. 
Second, and equally important, are expenditure shares regarding developmental policies and 
basic governmental functions. On average these cover about one fifth of total spending each. 
Spending on basic governmental functions is most of the time less important in poor and middle 
class suburbs than in affluent and low density suburbs. In affluent and middle class suburbs a bit 
more is spent on developmental policies than in communes belonging to the other two types 
Finally the least important category making not even a tenth of total expenditures is represented 
by spending related to amenities policies. Here poor suburbs, along with middle class suburbs, 
display the highest expenditure shares. 
 
5  Political and socio-economic determinants of local public policy 
profiles 
As we have seen in the previous section the communal typology explains only small portions of 
expenditure shares variance within metropolitan areas. In the following we are going to estimate 
the effects of more specific socio-economic and political determinants on the size of expenditure 
shares regarding our classification. In order to run the analyses with sufficient number of cases 
only data from 2000 is used. Considering the nested structure of the data (communes grouped in 
metropolitan areas) we use multi-level regression techniques. 
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Table 14: Determinants of the share of expenditures for basic governmental functions 2000 
(multi-level regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Socio-economic 
determinants Political determinants 
Socio-economic and 
political determinants 
Fixed Effects    
Constant -.081 
(.462) 
-.139 
(.443) 
.149 
(.227) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born .396 
(.209)  
.534** 
(.182) 
SES Hardship -.225 
(.252) 
 -.461 
(.236) 
SES Generally .126 
(.211) 
 .234 
(.203) 
Manufacturing occupation .083 
(.131) 
 -.210 
(.122) 
Simpson index of economic diversity -.085 
(.090) 
 -.080 
(.088) 
Residents under 18 years -.371** 
(.142) 
 -.156 
(.140) 
Retirees .303 
(.169) 
 .417 
(.157) 
Single-family housing -.176 
(.170) 
 -.252 
(.155) 
Ln(Density) -.493** 
(.175) 
 -.453** 
(.173) 
Out-commuting .220* 
(.107) 
 .147 
(.107) 
Distance to the centre .233* 
(.114) 
 .313** 
(.108) 
New housing .422** 
(.127) 
 .357** 
(.128) 
Stability of residence .208 
(.118) 
 .171 
(.117) 
Ln(Population) -.166 
(.173) 
 -.329 
(.167) 
Population growth .040 
(.108) 
 -.156 
(.105) 
Median voter left/right 
 
.389** 
(.130) 
.659** 
(.101) 
Median voter globalisation winner/loser 
 
.070 
(.383) 
.371 
(.372) 
Effective number of parties 
 
-.290* 
(.142) 
-.051 
(.133) 
National election turnout 
 
-.150 
(.085) 
-.313** 
(.099) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
 
+** +** +** 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
 
  
 
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
 
-** -** -** 
Segregation (dissimilarity index) 
 
   
Polarization (Nathan-Adams index) 
 
 
  
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .297** 
(.042) 
.398 
(.057) 
.274** 
(.039) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .559 
(.473) 
.417 
(.365) 
.000 
(.000) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 175.150 205.008 156.007 
N 101 102 101 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=3; metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle and Berne) simultaneous estimation of the effects of communal and metropolitan 
area variables failed. Therefore coefficients of models without variables at the second level are reported. Added are the direction and the level of significance of 
significant estimates from models with single level 2 variables. Our results should thus be interpreted as indications and not as univocal evidence. 
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Table 14 shows the results of the analysis on the determinants of the share of basic governmental 
functions spending. If we only consider socio-economic determinants (Model 1) the share of 
expenditures on basic governmental functions is strongly affected by the proportion of people 
under 18 years, population density and new housing. Additionally there are some weaker effects 
of out-commuting and distance to the centre. 
Therefore the more people under 18 years - a proxy for families - the smaller the proportion of 
total expenditures allocated to basic governmental functions. This may be related to the wide 
variety of demands families have vis-à-vis public services (child care, schools, street safety etc.). 
Population density has a negative effect, too. Densely inhabited places may also demand various 
public services which reduces the share of basic governmental spending. New housing, however, 
is positively related to basic governmental spending. Hence the higher the proportion of new 
housing the more of total expenditure is spent for basic governmental functions. One may think 
here of political preferences for small government and less demand of public services in new 
housing areas. The positive effect of out-commuting may be explained by less demand of public 
services as more people may find them in other places (e.g. core city). Distance to the centre is 
also positively related to expenditure share of basic governmental functions. 
Considering only political variables (model 2) we find a positive effect of the left/right position 
of a commune's median voter. Furthermore the effective number of parties shows a negative 
effect. This can be interpreted as an indicator for a variety of political demands which puts 
pressure on local government to provide public goods and services mitigating thus the proportion 
of basic governmental spending. 
In the combined model (model 3) the negative effect of the proportion of people under 18 years 
vanishes. Instead, the proportion of foreign born people becomes significant and displays a 
positive effect on spending on basic governmental functions. As regards the political variables 
right wing voting is still positively related to expenditures in favour of basic governmental 
functions. However, the negative effect of the number of effective parties becomes insignificant 
whereas the negative effect of the national election turnout becomes significant. 
Although the number of metropolitan areas included in the analysis is very small the results are 
rather clear-cut: the share of basic governmental spending is, on average, higher in communes of 
lager metropolitan areas and it is smaller in communes of metropolitan areas where the 
population is concentrated in a few communes. 
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Table 15: Determinants of the share of expenditures for redistributive policies 2000 
(multi-level regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Socio-economic 
determinants Political determinants 
Socio-economic and 
political determinants 
Fixed Effects    
Constant -.005 
(.229) 
.104 
(.312) 
.297 
(.383) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born .299 
(.307)  
.244 
(.307) 
SES Hardship .102 
(.406) 
 .176 
(.398) 
SES Generally -.335 
(.340) 
 -.405 
(.343) 
Manufacturing occupation -.119 
(.210) 
 -.093 
(.205) 
Simpson index of economic diversity .056 
(.150) 
 .034 
(.148) 
Residents under 18 years .362 
(.237) 
 .364 
(.237) 
Retirees .207 
(.263) 
 -.068 
(.266) 
Single-family housing .199 
(.250) 
 .134 
(.261) 
Ln(Density) .472 
(.292) 
 .609* 
(.292) 
Out-commuting -.075 
(.178) 
 -.028 
(.180) 
Distance to the centre -.016 
(.183) 
 .050 
(.183) 
New housing .274 
(.199) 
 .332 
(.217) 
Stability of residence .154 
(.198) 
 .125 
(.198) 
Ln(Population) -.196 
(.286) 
 -.154 
(.282) 
Population growth .117 
(.180) 
 .097 
(.178) 
Median voter left/right 
 
-.237 
(.159) 
-.314 
(.171) 
Median voter globalisation winner/loser 
 
-.258 
(.574) 
-.737 
(.627) 
Effective number of parties 
 
-.330 
(.219) 
-.323 
(.224) 
National election turnout 
 
-.144 
(.130) 
.102 
(.166) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
 
  +* 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
 
  
 
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
 
 
  
Segregation (dissimilarity index) 
 
 
 
 
Polarization (Nathan-Adams index) 
 
 
  
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .838** 
(.118) 
.953** 
(.133) 
.782** 
(.110) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 268.745 284.566 261.731 
N 101 102 101 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=3; metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle and Berne) simultaneous estimation of the effects of communal and metropolitan 
area variables failed. Therefore coefficients of models without variables at the second level are reported. Added are the direction and the level of significance of 
significant estimates from models with single level 2 variables. Our results should thus be interpreted as indications and not as univocal evidence. 
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As regards redistributive spending (Table 15) there are almost no significant effects and none of 
them is stable. The combined model (Model 3) reveals weakly positive effects of population 
density and the size of the metropolitan area. Communes with high population density and 
communes in large metropolitan areas display on average higher shares of expenditures for 
redistributive policies. Interestingly some variables that can be expected to foster redistributive 
spending do not show significant effects. Spending on redistributive policies is thus independent 
from the average socio-economic status, the importance of families (indicated by the proportion 
of people under 18 years) and the proportion of retired people. 
Yet, although the effects are not significant the signs point mostly to the expected directions in 
the above models 1 and 3. They are positive with social hardship (low socio-economic status) and 
with the proportion of people under 18 years. The sign is negative with general socio-economic 
status. In the case of retired people the relation changes the direction between the two models. 
The signs of the median voter variables also point to expected directions. Left wing voting and 
voting in favour of globalization loser show positive - though insignificant - signs in both the 
exclusively political as well as the combined model. 
The share of developmental spending (Table 16) is mostly affected by place-based socio-
economic variables (models 1 and 3). New housing, stability of residence and distance to the 
centre show negative effects. The negative effects of stability of residence may be due to less 
need for developmental policies. In the cases of new housing and distance to the centre the 
negative signs may reflect recently urbanized communes that have not yet implemented planned 
infrastructure projects. 
Political variables are of lesser importance (model 2). In the political variables only model 
national election turnout has a positive effect on developmental spending. This correlation, 
however, is not stable as it becomes insignificant in the combined model (model 3). 
There are stable metropolitan area effects on developmental spending. Communes in large 
metropolitan areas display on average smaller shares of expenditures for developmental policies. 
Metropolitan fragmentation and concentration of population in a few communes have positive 
effects on developmental spending. Finally polarization between core city and the suburban area 
tends also to have a positive effect on developmental spending. 
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Table 16: Determinants of the share of expenditures for developmental policies 2000 
(multi-level regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Socio-economic 
determinants Political determinants 
Socio-economic and 
political determinants 
Fixed Effects    
Constant -.104 
(.368) 
-.104 
(.412) 
-.301 
(.450) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born -.479 
(.262)  
-.420 
(.269) 
SES Hardship -.071 
(.321) 
 -.047 
(.325) 
SES Generally -.304 
(.269) 
 -.307 
(.281) 
Manufacturing occupation -.076 
(.168) 
 -.052 
(.170) 
Simpson index of economic diversity -.016 
(.115) 
 -.001 
(.116) 
Residents under 18 years .059 
(.182) 
 .006 
(.187) 
Retirees -.397 
(.215) 
 -.414 
(.219) 
Single-family housing .328 
(.216) 
 .264 
(.226) 
Ln(Density) .124 
(.225) 
 .053 
(.228) 
Out-commuting -.202 
(.137) 
 -.163 
(.141) 
Distance to the centre -.320* 
(.146) 
 -.338* 
(.146) 
New housing -.609** 
(.162) 
 -.526** 
(.174) 
Stability of residence -.439** 
(.152) 
 -.425** 
(.155) 
Ln(Population) .282 
(.222) 
 .307 
(.223) 
Population growth -.162 
(.139) 
 -.134 
(.142) 
Median voter left/right 
 
-.085 
(.159) 
.024 
(.166) 
Median voter globalisation winner/loser 
 
.188 
(.472) 
.428 
(.503) 
Effective number of parties 
 
.230 
(.176) 
.034 
(.178) 
National election turnout 
 
.283** 
(.105) 
.170 
(.130) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
 
-** -** -** 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
 
+** +* +** 
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
 
+** +** +** 
Segregation (dissimilarity index) 
 
 
 
 
Polarization (Nathan-Adams index) 
 
+** +** +* 
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .490 
(.070) 
.610** 
(.087) 
.478** 
(.068) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .281 
(.257) 
.255 
(.240) 
.271 
(.249) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 222.424 246.140 219.923 
N 101 102 101 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=3; metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle and Berne) simultaneous estimation of the effects of communal and metropolitan 
area variables failed. Therefore coefficients of models without variables at the second level are reported. Added are the direction and the level of significance of 
significant estimates from models with single level 2 variables. Our results should thus be interpreted as indications and not as univocal evidence. 
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Table 17: Determinants of the share of expenditures for amenities policies 2000 
(multi-level regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Socio-economic 
determinants Political determinants 
Socio-economic and 
political determinants 
Fixed Effects    
Constant .130 
(.206) 
-.223 
(.301) 
.037 
(.339) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born -.482 
(.276)  
-.338 
(.272) 
SES Hardship .542 
(.365) 
 .416 
(.353) 
SES Generally 1.107** 
(.305) 
 1.020** 
(.304) 
Manufacturing occupation .262 
(.188) 
 .224 
(.182) 
Simpson index of economic diversity .043 
(.134) 
 .120 
(.131) 
Residents under 18 years -.068 
(.213) 
 -.184 
(.210) 
Retirees -.149 
(.236) 
 -.112 
(.235) 
Single-family housing -.735** 
(.224) 
 -.873** 
(.231) 
Ln(Density) -.227 
(.262) 
 -.325 
(.258) 
Out-commuting .120 
(.160) 
 .166 
(.159) 
Distance to the centre .211 
(.164) 
 .251 
(.162) 
New housing -.080 
(.178) 
 .085 
(.192) 
Stability of residence .253 
(.177) 
 .378* 
(.175) 
Ln(Population) .118 
(.256) 
 .008 
(.250) 
Population growth .091 
(.162) 
 .173 
(.157) 
Median voter left/right 
 
.031 
(.153) 
.056 
(.151) 
Median voter globalisation winner/loser 
 
.317 
(.553) 
.191 
(.555) 
Effective number of parties 
 
.553** 
(.211) 
.538** 
(.199) 
National election turnout 
 
-.039 
(.126) 
.056 
(.147) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
 
   
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
 
 
-* 
 
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
 
 
  
Segregation (dissimilarity index) 
 
 
-*  
Polarization (Nathan-Adams index) 
 
 
-*  
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .674** 
(.095) 
.887** 
(.124) 
.613** 
(.086) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 246.802 277.265 237.118 
N 101 102 101 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=3; metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle and Berne) simultaneous estimation of the effects of communal and metropolitan 
area variables failed. Therefore coefficients of models without variables at the second level are reported. Added are the direction and the level of significance of 
significant estimates from models with single level 2 variables. Our results should thus be interpreted as indications and not as univocal evidence. 
 
As may have been expected spending on amenities policies (Table 17) is favoured in communes 
where the average socio-economic status is high. Furthermore the proportion of single family 
housing has a strong negative effect. In the combined model one finds an additional positive 
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effect of stability of residence. It seems that amenities policies are not a question of political 
preferences but that they are mostly affected by the number of parties. The more fragmented 
party preferences the more money is spent on amenities policies in a commune. 
Finally there are no clear differences among metropolitan areas. In the political variables only 
model fragmentation, segregation and polarization have weak negative effects on amenities 
policies spending. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Using data that has not been available up to now, this paper offers several insights into the 
capacities of local governments to provide public goods, the patterns of local revenue, and the 
distribution of local expenditures in large metropolitan areas of Switzerland. Based on a fivefold 
typology of metropolitan communes our research has revealed important socio-structural 
disparities and political differences related to the functional differentiation of the urban space. To 
some extent these discontinuities are mirrored by dissimilar governance and policy making across 
metropolitan areas. 
Despite the flaws of the dataset which we endeavor to remedy some results are worth retaining. 
Firstly, there are considerable differences between core cities and their suburbs as regards income 
and expenditures. Core cities gain and spend more per capita than the suburbs. Financial 
capacities of core cities are thus important which could help alleviating trade offs between policy 
preferences. For instance core cities can afford to spend simultaneously on redistributive policies 
and development policies whereas suburban communes have to decide on priorities. Yet, more 
detailed data on expenditures of core cities is needed to test this hypothesis more accurately. 
Furthermore, the share of revenues from tax entries in core cities is smaller than in suburban 
communes whereas the share of revenues from user charges is higher. The important amount of 
revenues from user charges can be related to centrality functions of core cities. Nevertheless, core 
cities display higher tax rates compared to their suburbs. However, tax rates of core cities are 
below the overall average tax rate including rural communes. Finally, although the shares of 
transfer revenues of cores cities are similar to those of suburban communes the proportion of total 
expenditure in favour of transfer payments is clearly less important which also helps increasing 
governance capacity in core cities. 
Secondly, leaving aside core cities which have not yet provided appropriate data, the most 
important share of local government spending is represented by expenditures for redistributive 
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policies. The proportion equals around half of the total expenditures. Poor suburbs often spend 
most on this category. Expenditures for developmental policies and basic governmental functions 
are equally important and make one fifth of total expenditure each. Basic governmental functions 
spending is generally less important in poor and middle class suburbs than in affluent and low 
density suburbs. Conversely affluent and middle class suburbs spend a bit more on 
developmental policies. Expenditures related to amenities policies correspond to a tenth of total 
local public spending. Interestingly poor suburbs, along with middle class suburbs, display the 
highest shares of spending on amenities policies. 
Thirdly, multi-level modeling reveals some more detailed explanations of expenditure disparities. 
However, local governmental spending can not be explained by a single model. Different 
expenditure categories are explained by different sets of variables. Socio-economic as well as 
political variables may play important roles, and characteristics of metropolitan areas need to be 
taken into account. Whereas basic governmental expenditures and spending on developmental 
policies are more place-based amenities policies spending seems to be somewhat more affected 
by the socio-economic composition of a commune. Redistributive policies spending, however, 
can not be explained conclusively by our models. 
As regards the political variables the question outlined in the introduction is whether and how 
ideological differences are linked to the spatial disparities as regards the provision of public 
goods and services. Interestingly there is only one expenditure category where the position of the 
median voter, our measure for partisanship and political preferences, shows a significant 
correlation. The share of spending on basic governmental functions is higher in communes that 
are with the right than in communes on the left. This may reflect preference for small 
government. While cutting expenditures on redistributive, developmental and amenities policies 
the share of spending on basic governmental functions increases. As regards spending on 
redistributive, developmental and amenities policies, however, politics does not matter. If the 
above results can be replicated using additional data our conclusion would be that spatial 
inequalities in metropolitan areas of Switzerland perpetuate themselves and that save preferences 
for small or big government citizens are well advised to vote 'with their feet' rather than through 
the ballot box. 
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Methodological Appendix 
A1 List of variables 
Table I: Description of variables used (if not indicated all variables refer to year 2000) 
Variable name definition missing values 
  commune-level variables   
Total revenue per capita total local revenue / population size 1990: 183/480 
2000: 243/482 
Total expenditure per capita total local expenditure / population size 1990: 193/480 
2000: 247/482 
Transfer revenues share of transfer payments revenue relative to total local 
revenue 
1990: 180/480 
2000: 240/482 
Transfer expenditures share of transfer payments expenditure relative to total local 
expenditure 
1990: 182/480 
2000: 242/482 
Tax entries share of tax entries relative to total local revenue 1990: 182/480 
2000: 200/482 
Revenue from user charges share of revenue from user charges relative to total local 
revenue 
1990: 180/480 
2000: 197/482 
Tax rate index index: 100*(tij/mean(tj)), 
where: 
t: tax rate 
i: commune subscript 
j: canton subscript 
2001: 482/482 
Basic governmental functions Share of total expenditure of the official functional categories 
- central administrative services 
- public safety 
1990: 89/480 
2000: 102/482 
Redistributive policies Share of total expenditure of the official functional categories 
- education 
- social welfare 
1990: 89/480 
2000: 102/482 
Developmental policies Share of total expenditure of the official functional categories 
- transportation 
- environment and land use planning 
- economic development 
1990: 89/480 
2000: 102/482 
Amenities policies Share of total expenditure of the official functional categories 
- culture and leisure 
- health 
1990: 89/480 
2000: 102/482 
Foreign born proportion of foreign born people when place of birth is known 0/482 
SES Hardship summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/5, 
where: 
x1: proportion of people with low socio-economic status 
x2: proportion of unemployed people 
x3: proportion of people with low education profile 
x4 proportion of people in residences where number of rooms is 
smaller than number of occupants 
x5: proportion of retired people 
0/482 
SES Generally summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/3, 
where: 
x1: proportion of people with university degree 
x2: median income 
x3: proportion of heads of household with higher education 
(higher professional education, applied sciences university, 
university) 
0/482 
Manufacturing occupation proportion of occupied people working in the 2nd sector 0/482 
Simpson index of economic diversity percentage of maximum value of the Simpson index (Simpson 
index=1-Σpi2, where p stands for the proportion of occupied 
people in three socio-professional categories; 
maximum value: 
Simpson index when all p= 1/number of categories) 
0/482 
Residents under 18 years proportion of people under 18 years of age 0/482 
Retirees proportion of retired people 0/482 
Single-family housing proportion of residences that are single-family houses 0/482 
Ln(Density) natural logarithm of population/commune’s surface 0/482 
Out-commuting proportion of occupied people working in another commune 
than commune of residence 
0/482 
Distance to the centre geographic distance from a commune’s centre to the centre of 
metropolitan area’s core city in metres: sqrt((x1-x2)2*(y1-y2)2), 
where x and y indicate coordinates of geographic centres 
5/482 
New housing proportion of dwelling houses built during the last 20 years 
(without renovations) 
0/482 
Stability of residence proportion of population living in the same commune during the 
last five years 
0/482 
Ln(Population) natural logarithm of population size 0/482 
Population growth population growth rate: (x10-x0)/x0, 
where: 
x0: population size in year 0 
x10: population in year 0+10 
0/482 
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Variable name definition missing values 
  commune-level variables (continued)   
Position of the median voter on the left/right conflict 
scale 
(see below operationalization), average of the National Council 
elections 1987/1991 and 1999/2003 
0/482 
Position of the median voter on the globalisation 
winner/loser conflict scale 
(see below operationalization), average of the National Council 
elections 1987/1991 and 1999/2003 
0/482 
National election turnout average turnout of the elections of the National Council 
1987/1991 and 1999/2003 
0/482 
Local election turnout average turnout of the two consecutive elections of the 
communal executive before and after 2000 
316/482 
Effective number of parties index: 1/ Σpi2, where p stands for the vote share of party i in the 
National Council elections; averaged over elections 1999/2003 
0/482 
 
Variable name definition missing values 
   MA-level variables   
Metropolitan population population size of metropolitan area 0/7 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) number of communes per 10,000 inhabitants divided by the 
central city’s share of the overall metropolitan population in 
percent 
0/7 
Concentration (Herfindahl) index = Σpi2, 
where: 
p: metropolitan commune’s population share 
0/7 
Segregation (dissimilarity index) [ ]∑
=
−−=
n
i
ii PTPPptD
1
)1(2/  
where: 
ti: total population of areal unit i of n communes 
pi: minority proportion of areal unit i of n communes 
T: population size of the whole metropolitan area 
P: minority proportion of the whole metropolitan area 
0/7 
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index Composite city-suburb hardship disparity index according to 
Nathan and Adams (1976, 1989), based on the following 
indicators: 
a) Low educational profile: proportion of residents aged above 
14 with no or only compulsory schooling 
b) University degrees: proportion of residents holding an 
academic degree 
c) Dependents: proportion of population younger than 18 or 
older than 65 years 
d) Unemployment: proportion of population without a job and 
receiving a pension 
e) Cultural heterogeneity: proportion of school classes with 
more than 30% non-native speakers 
0/7 
Sources: 
- coordinates of the communes’ geographical centres: Institute for Transport Planning and Systems (ETH Zurich) 
- median income: Federal Tax Administration 
- local election turnout: Internet sites of the cantons of Basle-Country (www.bl.ch), Geneva (www.ge.ch), Lucerne (www.lu.ch) and Ticino (www.ti.ch) 
- local public finance data: statistical offices and finance administrations of cantons and communes 
- all other data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office:  
 
 
 
A2 Conflict scales 
The scores of the conflict scales have been calculated using the Manifesto Research Group data 
(Budge et al. 2001) by subtracting the sum of appropriate emphases to designate the positive pole 
of the scale from the sum of appropriate emphases indicating the negative pole. 
 
The left/right conflict was operationalised following the procedure adopted by the Manifesto 
Research Group (see Budge and Klingemann 2001: 21f., for a detailed description of the data see 
Appendix III in Budge et al. (eds) 2001). 
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Figure I: Manifesto Research Group left/right conflict scale (Budge et al. 2001) 
per104 Military: positive per103 Anti-Imperialism 
per201 Freedom and Human Rights per105 Military: negative 
per203 Constitutionalism: positive per106 Peace 
per305 Political authority per107 Internationalism: positive 
per401 Free enterprise per202 Democracy 
per402 Incentives per403 Market regulation 
per407 Protectionism: negative per404 Economic planning 
per414 Multiculturalism: negative per406 Protectionism: positive 
per505 Welfare state limitation per412 Controlled economy 
per601 National way of life: positive per413 Nationalisation 
per603 Traditional morality: positive per504 Welfare state expansion 
per605 Law and order per506 Education expansion 
per606 Social harmony 
minus 
per701 Labour groups: positive 
 
The globalisation winner/loser conflict scale was operationalised according to Kriesi et al.’s 
(2006) definition of political programs regarding globalisation winners and losers. More 
precisely, conflicting emphases of Internationalism, European Community, protectionism, 
national identity and multiculturalism have been retained. 
Figure II: Globalisation winner/loser conflict scale 
per109 Internationalism: negative per107 Internationalism: positive 
per110 European Community: negative per108 European Community: positive 
per403 Regulate capitalism per401 Free enterprise 
per406 Protectionism: positive per407 Protectionism: negative 
per504 Social services: expansion per414 Economic orthodoxy 
per601 National way of life: positive per604 Traditional Morality: negative 
per603 Traditional morality: positive per607 Multiculturalism: positive 
per608 Multiculturalism: negative 
minus 
  
 
 
A3 Median voter 
For each commune the position of the median voter on the conflict scale had been calculated 
using the following formula (see Kim and Fording 2001:163): 
 
W
F
CLM −+= 50           (3) 
 
Where: 
M: median voter position (conflict scale) 
L: the lower end (conflict scale) of the interval containing the median 
C: the cumulative frequency (vote share) up to but not including the interval containing the median 
F: the frequency (vote share) in the interval containing the median 
W: the width of the interval containing the median 
